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# CIA alarmed as never before — cannot spot Soviet mobile ICBMs

**M**y readers may imagine that I haven't reacted to the CIA's unprecedented testimony before Congress in June concerning the phenomenal growth of Soviet weapons because I've been away in the Catskills getting a tan. Not me. I've been at my desk merely waiting to see how the media would react to the event.

"Soviet analysis" as conducted by the CIA can be divided into four periods:

- 1947 to 1963: The Soviet regime is aggressive and militarily formidable. This is why the CIA was established in the first place.

- 1964 to 1975: The Soviet regime is peaceful and militarily backward. Forget about their rockers — they can't even make electric shavers.

- 1976 to 1984: Is the Soviet regime peaceful or aggressive, militarily formidable or militarily backward? A question for philosophers, not for the CIA, to answer.

- June 1985 to ? : Brothers, they've been racing ahead of us in almost every field of weaponry! They've been developing the high-energy laser and hyper-velocity kinetic-energy weapons of "Star Wars" since the '60s! As to what they're going to do in the next 10 years — holy nuclear smokes, it's hair-raising!

The major (liberal-Democrat) news media have played down the CIA's stunning about-face as much as they know how. Instead of front-page banner headlines, there were obscure items on the inside pages. The minor (conservative-Republican) press has hugged the good old CIA just as the liberal Democrats hugged it last year when it announced some mythical downward correction in the annual rate of Soviet military spending.

But beyond all the hugging I wanted to look at the CIA's testimony itself, so I waited for the media dust to settle.

## Display of power

While concealing the specifics of their military power, the Soviet

rulers ~~have~~ never concealed its general growth. On the contrary, they have always advertised it. Finally even the CIA would be compelled to notice this blatant advertising, the frightened United States would invest more into its defense, and another "spiral of the arms race" would begin. What did the Soviet rulers gain as a result? Why do they brag of the growth of their military might instead of concealing it?

Two important advantages that the Soviets gain in the arms race have often been overlooked in the West:

- Only two countries of the world have been engaged in this arms race — Russia and the United States. All others have been left far behind. While the Soviet war machine never outdistanced the United States so much that the United States couldn't regain its capacity to defend itself, this machine has been surpassing everyone else, including its neighbors, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, West Germany, Turkey, Norway and Japan. More and more, other countries have been turning into defenseless chicks and the United States into the helpless mother hen who is supposed to protect them against the Soviet hawk, which is able to strike any chick at any time anywhere on the globe.

- Since the CIA has never had any espionage capability worthy of the name (except for about a one-year period due to KGB defector Oleg Penkovsky) it never said anything in its testimonies about specific Soviet strategic intentions. Nor is the June testimony an exception. All we learned was that Soviet might has been growing, and all that the United States can do is invest more into defense in general. While such general defense investments may finally bankrupt our country, they do not help against sudden specific Soviet strategic thrusts in the Pacific, the Middle East, Europe, Africa and South and Central America. This is like a global game of blindman's buff, in which the United States as "it" knows that the world is full of dan-

gers but not where they will come from next.

## CIA's generalities

To sample the CIA's June testimony, let's analyze one subsection entitled *Antisubmarine Warfare*, consisting of four sentences (p. 6 of the statement of June 26 put out by Congress). Here it is in italics, with my comments after each sentence.

- *The Soviets still lack effective means to locate US ballistic missile submarines at sea.* This is one of the CIA's dangerous declarations based only on the CIA's conviction that what it doesn't know doesn't exist. What does the CIA mean by the clever disclaimer "effective"? Does it mean that the Soviets do already have such means, but they are still ineffective? How ineffective — 90, 60, 10 percent?

- *We expect them [the Soviets] to continue to pursue vigorously all antisubmarine warfare (ASW) technologies as potential solutions to the problems of countering US SSBNs [nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines] and defending their own SSBNs against US attack submarines.* This is the same as prophesying that the Soviets will "continue to pursue vigorously" their military might. You bet they'll continue to do so!

- *We are concerned about the energetic Soviet ASW [anti-submarine warfare] research and technology efforts.* We are, too. Thank you for these "intelligence data." What about indicating which specific ASW research and technology efforts the Soviet military are engaged in?

- *However, we do not believe there is a realistic possibility the Soviets will be able to deploy in the 1990s a system that could pose any significant threat to US SSBNs on patrol.* Another vague non-committal prophecy. What is a "significant" threat? The Soviet ability to locate and sink 10, 60, 90 percent of the US SSBNs?

The CIA knows about the existence of Soviet ground missiles since the Soviet military cannot help revealing them in test flights

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or displaying them deliberately in Red Square parades. Let's look at a Pentagon artist's drawing of one of them — say, an SS-X-25.

This is a cylinder about 60 feet long. It was flight-tested in 1983, and hence is known to cover about 7,000 miles. If installed on the Soviet Kamchatka Peninsula it is able to target the whole of the United States, Canada and Mexico. The missile can be well expected to become operational next year. The Pentagon artist shows how cozily this missile lies inside a house (garage? warehouse? store?), the roof of which slides open, and lo! up goes the missile ready to fire. If this is the case, the missile can lie inside any Soviet structure having a roof.

No less cozily can it also lie inside a diesel truck of the kind Henry Kissinger helped the Soviets to build, or inside a Soviet freight or passenger railroad car, and the car can roll into a tunnel where no U.S. satellite radars or infrared cameras will detect the missile in a

thousand years.

For the first time in its history the CIA sounds alarmed and its testimony is alarming, not to say panicky. No wonder.

So far U.S. satellites have detected Soviet ICBMs because they were on stationary launch pads or inside concrete silos. How can the CIA detect these ICBMs now, hidden inside ordinary buildings or mobile trucks and railroad cars? It couldn't very well confess that it is unable to monitor Soviet mobile missilery, for Congress would say, "You? Unable? What about all those spies of yours Russia is supposedly riddled with, and all those stories in the press about the CIA's penetration of the Kremlin? Weren't you the ones who practically purloined Khrushchev's secret speech out of his personal safe?"

Instead of making a straight admission of its inability to monitor Soviet mobile nuclear missiles, the CIA has sounded a general alarm. It doesn't want to be held responsible for a mobile-nuclear-missile Pearl Harbor. And thank God at least for that.

Fellow Americans, we are in the most dangerous decade of American history.

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